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Inflation targeting (henceforth IT) has emerged as a significant monetary policy 
framework in both developed and transition economies. It has been in place for a 
decade or more in a number of countries — with around 20 central banks 
adopting it as their basic monetary policy framework. Some authors have argued 
that for transition economies undergoing sustained financial liberalization and 
integration in world financial markets IT is an attractive monetary policy 
framework. Consequently there is some pressure for such economies to adopt IT 
as a core element in their monetary policy frameworks.  
 
 The present paper evaluates the case for IT in India. It begins with stating, 
almost from first principles, the objectives of monetary policy in India. I argue 
that inflation control cannot be an exclusive concern of monetary policy in a 
country such as India with a substantial poverty problem. The rationales for IT is 
then spelt out as are some nuances of the practical implementation of IT. The 
paper provides some evidence on the effects of IT in developed and transition 
economies and argues that although IT may have been responsible for 
maintaining a low inflation regime it has not brought down the inflation rate 
itself substantially. Further, the volatility of exchange rate and output movements 
in transition countries adopting IT has been higher than in developed market 
economies. The paper then discusses India’s experience with using rules-based 
policy measures (nominal targets) and elaborates on the reasons (as espoused in 
the extant literature) why India is not ready for IT. It is further shown that even if 
the Reserve Bank of India wanted to, it could not pursue IT since the short-term 
interest rate (the principal policy tool used to affect inflation in countries 
working with IT) does not have significant effects on the rate of inflation. The 
paper concludes by listing monetary policy options for India at the current time.   
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I.  Introduction  
 
Inflation targeting (henceforth IT) has emerged as a significant monetary policy 
framework in both developed and transition economies. It has been in place for a 
decade or more in a number of countries — with around 20 central banks adopting it 
as their basic monetary policy framework.  
 Over time IT has evolved across a number of dimensions, including its degree 
of flexibility and approaches to communication. Some early adopters have shown 
greater flexibility by allowing inflation to vary more widely around the target range 
and, in some cases, some other macroeconomic goals to be taken into account. Central 
banks have also enhanced their communication with their respective publics about 
their targets and modus operandi.  
 Some authors have argued that for transition economies undergoing sustained 
financial liberalization and integration in world financial markets IT is an attractive 
monetary policy framework. Consequently there is some pressure for such economies 
to adopt IT as a core element in their monetary policy frameworks. 
 The present paper evaluates the case for IT in India. It begins (in section II) 
with stating, almost from first principles, the objectives of monetary policy in India. I 
argue that inflation control cannot be an exclusive concern of monetary policy in a 
country such as India with a substantial poverty problem. The rationale for IT is spelt 
out in section III of the paper.  This section also develops some nuances of the 
practical implementation of IT.  Section IV provides some evidence on the effects of 
IT in developed and transition economies and argues that, although IT may have been 
responsible for maintaining a low inflation regime, it has not brought down the 
inflation rate itself substantially.  Further, the volatility of exchange rate and output 
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movements in transition countries adopting IT has been higher than in developed 
market economies. Section V discusses India’s experience with using rules-based 
policy measures (nominal targets) whereas section VI discusses some recent 
developments in the development of monetary policy in India. Section VII reviews 
the reasons (as espoused in the extant literature) why India is not ready for IT.  
Section VIII develops this these further by arguing that, even if the Reserve Bank of 
India wanted to, it could not pursue IT since the short-term interest rate (the principal 
policy tool used to affect inflation in countries working with IT) does not have 
significant effects on the rate of inflation. Section IX reviews monetary policy options 
for India and concludes.    
 
II.  The Objectives of Monetary Policy in India   
 
By popular consensus an overriding short-term concern of monetary policy is 
stabilization of the price level. However, since India has long had a serious problem 
of poverty, its alleviation has to be the cornerstone of the success of any policy 
including monetary policy. There is substantial agreement now that the most import-
ant factor responsible for reduction in poverty is rapid economic growth along with 
some supporting redistributive measures. Dollar and Kraay (2001) show for a broad 
cross section of countries including India, that the incomes of the poorest 20 per cent 
of the population rise in proportion to average income.1 Furthermore, growth seems to 
matter more than factors such as governance. The overwhelming importance of 
economic growth to poverty reduction can be illustrated with Chinese data (Table 1).  
 
 
                                                 
1 Even if the Dollar–Kraay result is discounted because of the well-known problems associated with 
cross-country regressions, at the very least there is no evidence that economic growth hurts poverty 
alleviation (Winters et al. 2002).  
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Table 1: Growth and Poverty Alleviation in China 
 
Year Annual poverty reduction announced 
by the government (10 
thousand) 
The growth rate of 
GDP  
per capita  
(%) 




The growth rate of 
farmers’  
net income  
per capita  
(%) 
1978–1985 1786 8.3 10.0 15.1 
1985–1990 800 6.2 2.5 3.0 
1990–1997 500 9.9 8.0 5.0 
1997–2002 436 7.7 3.4 3.8 
1978–2002 924 8.1 5.6 7.2 
Source: Chinese Statistical Abstract, various issues. 
  
For more than 26 years the Chinese per capita GDP has grown at more than 8 per cent 
per annum. Poverty has declined at an average of 9,240,000 persons per year.   
It is instructive to compare the growth performance of the Chinese economy 
with that of India.  Data on GDP and per-capita growth in India are presented in Table 
2.  
Table 2: GDP and Per Capita GDP growth in India  
 GDP growth (%) 
Period  Aggregate Per-capita 
1972–1982  3.5 1.2 
1982–1992  5.2 3.0 
1992–2002  6.0 3.9 
Source: Kelkar (2004)  
 
Clearly, the Indian growth experience does not match China’s.  Hence, the reduction 
in poverty in India has been nowhere as spectacular as in China, despite the fact that 
inequality in China has grown more sharply than in India (Jha, 2004). India’s national 
poverty headcount ratio fell only by about 12 percentage points over the 46-year 
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period 1951–52 to 19972 and the rate of poverty reduction was higher in the 1980s 
than in the reform period, post 1991.  Hence, two important conclusions emerge from 
an analysis of the Indian data.  First, economic growth in India has not been high 
enough to drastically reduce the incidence of poverty.  Second, the quality of growth 
in the 1980s was different from that in the 1990s, so that even with (slightly) lower 
growth a greater reduction in poverty could take place in the earlier period.3  
To put it bluntly, the 9th Five-year Plan document of the Planning Commission 
of the Government of India estimated that Indian GDP would need to grow at 7 per 
cent4 or more to absorb the current unemployed and the anticipated increment to the 
labour force. However, the Indian economy is as yet unable to achieve a trend rate of 
growth of 7 per cent and the Ninth Five-Year Plan’s target to create 54 million new 
jobs during the Plan period (1997–2002) has not been fulfilled.  Hence, at the margin 
the unemployment problem is getting steadily worse.5  I present data on employment 
and unemployment using this criterion (in Table 3). The notion of employment used is 
that of Current Daily Status (CDS), as this measure of employment is net of the 
varying degrees of unemployment experienced by those who are otherwise classified 
as employed on usual status basis.   
                                                 
2 Results from the 1999–2000 National Sample Survey show a larger drop in poverty; however, this 
Survey’s methodology does not match those of the earlier surveys. Once corrections for the change in 
methodology are made the drop in poverty turns out to be modest.  
3 A third conclusion, not indicated in the analysis above, is that the incidence of poverty is getting 
regionally concentrated (Jha, 2004).   
4 On 6 April 2005, while assessing the mid-term progress of the Tenth Five year Plan Indian Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh ruled out the Indian economy attaining 7 per cent growth rate during the 
next two years.  
5 According to a study on employment conditions by the Planning Commission of India, unemploy-
ment is likely to have risen to 9.2 per cent in F2002 (base year for the country’s tenth five-year plan) 
from 7.3 per cent in F2000. As per this study, the unemployment rate at the end of the tenth five-year 
plan (F2003–F2007) is likely to rise to 11 per cent (45 million), even if average G cent growth rate 
during the next two years. DP growth of 6.5 per cent is achieved during the plan period.  With the 
increase in GDP in the first three years of the plan period averaging 6.1 per cent, growth needs to 
accelerate to an average of 7.1 per cent in F2006 and F2007 to achieve the average of 6.5 per cent in 
the plan period.  This, in our opinion, is optimistic.  Hence, there is a high chance that unemployment 
will be higher than the official estimate of 11 per cent by F2007.  On 8 April 2005 the Prime Minster 
noted that GDP growth during the next two years is not likely to reach 7 per cent, even on average.  
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Table 3: Employment and Unemployment on Current Daily Status (CDS) Basis 
 
 (Million) Growth per annum (%) 
 1983 1993–94 1999–2000 1983 to 1993–94 1993–94 to 1999–2000 
 All India 
Population  718.20 894.01 1003.97 2.0 1.95 
Labour Force  261.33 335.97 363.33 2.43 1.31 
Workforce  239.57 315.84 336.75 2.70 1.07 
Unemployment Rate (%)  8.30 5.99 7.32   
Number unemployed  21.76 20.13 26.58 -0.08 4.74 
 Rural 
Population  546.61 658.83 727.50 1.79 1.67 
Labour Force  204.18 255.38 270.39 2.15 0.96 
Workforce  187.92 241.04 250.89 2.40 0.67 
Unemployment Rate (%) 7.96 5.61 7.21   
Number unemployed  16.26 14.34 19.50 -1.19 5.26 
 Urban 
Population  171.59 234.98 276.47 3.04 2.74 
Labour Force  57.15 80.60 92.95 3.33 2.40 
Workforce  51.64 74.80 85.84 3.59 2.32 
Unemployment Rate (%) 9.64 7.19 7.65   
Number unemployed  5.51 5.80 7.11 0.49 3.45 
Source: Economic Survey, Government of India, 2002–03 
 
 
Table 3 shows that employment growth fell sharply in the 1990s. Both the 
absolute number of unemployed as well as the incidence of unemployment (expressed 
in terms of unemployed as a percentage of the labour force) increased during this 
period.  The decline in the rate of growth of employment was associated with a sharp 
decline in the rate of growth of the labour force (indicating delayed entry into the 
labour force through longer training/education).   
In addition to open unemployment there also exists India’s persistent 
problem of underemployment. Underemployment in various segments of the labour 
force is quite high. The estimates of the 50th Round of the NSS indicate that 
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although open unemployment was only 2 per cent in 1993–94 on a ‘usual status’ 
basis, the incidence of under-employment and unemployment taken together was as 
much as 10 per cent that year. This occurred despite the fact that the incidence of 
underemployment was reduced substantially in the decade ending 1993–94.  
In the organised sector (even in the organised manufacturing sector), 
employment barely changed between 1991 and 2001; from 1997 it has actually fallen.  
Data from the National Sample Survey indicate that total employment (organised and 
unorganised) is growing at about 1 per cent per annum.  This is half the projected 
growth rate of the labour force.6
It is obvious that if India is to reduce poverty rapidly, it is imperative to raise 
the trend rate of growth from near 6 per cent per year to 8 per cent or more.  India’s 
current growth rate, although high by current international standards, is not adequate 
to ensure speedy elimination of poverty and unemployment in India. Some authors 
such as Kelkar (2004) have opined that the current rate of growth could accelerate. 
Contributing to this acceleration is a broad series of reforms including financial sector 
reforms, increased globalization and widening and deepening of product and financial 
markets. Their impact gets reflected in key indicators such as market capitalization of 
the stock market, the technology and transparency of transactions, the sets of 
instruments traded, balance sheets of financial institutions and the degree of openness 
of the economy.  At the same time a mildly benign FDI policy framework has 
permitted greater tie-ups in high technology areas for production for domestic as well 
                                                 
6 In some quarters, it is thought that employment could grow rapidly on the back of exports of software 
services.  But current employment in that sector is about 700 thousand; on optimistic assumptions, it 
may rise to 2 million by 2010.  But India’s labour force is set to grow by about 8 million per year for 
the next 20 years.  Thus, it is most unlikely that India could grow fast without rapid growth in exports 
of labour-intensive manufactured goods.  Maintaining a competitive exchange rate is one of several 
policy measures that are relevant for this purpose (others include trade liberalisation, labour market 
reform, abolition of small-scale reservations and provision of primary education). Note that the share of 
the manufacturing sector in India’s GDP is only about 25 per cent and has not grown much in the past 
40 years. In contrast the share of the manufacturing sector in the Chinese or other East Asian market 
economies has been in excess of 40 per cent.  
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as external markets. Adding to the impetus for higher economic growth are certain 
structural changes — particularly on the supply side. In addition to the existing stock 
of ‘surplus labour’ India is set to reap an important demographic dividend. In 2000 
the proportion of the Indian population in the working age group (15–64 age bracket) 
was 60.9 per cent.  The UN’s Population Division has projected that this ratio will 
surpass the proportion of Japanese in this age group by 2012 and climb to over 66 per 
cent in 30 years. At that time it is poised to overtake China’s population in the same 
age. This will not only help to keep real wages down but also to raise the rate of 
private saving.  Clearly India’s population is undergoing rapid structural 
transformation: the proportion of the working population is rising; the labour force is 
less nutritionally deprived and increasingly literate. These changes imply substantial 
quality improvements.  Economic theory and international experience indicate that 
this could lead to sharp rises in labour productivity and an upward shift in the trend 
long run rate of growth of the Indian economy. There is a catch though. The labour 
force has to be productively employed for these productivity gains to be realized.  In 
view of the fact that adequate employment opportunities are not forthcoming political 
support for the reforms program (that has made the high growth possible in the first 
place) has waned (Jha, 2005).   
Hence a critical touchstone for the success of monetary policy must be 
whether it is able to provide a climate for even higher economic growth. In particular, 
monetary policy must thus be tuned to ensure that the inducement to invest is 
maintained at a high level (so that savings do not get wasted), which, in turn, would 
need a regime of low interest rates and high rates of exports of low value added 
manufacturing products.  While the first would imply an increase in the ‘safe limit’ 
for monetary expansion (so that unsterilized interventions in response to balance of 
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payments surpluses can play a larger role), the second would require the rupee to be 
slightly undervalued (to increase exports) and the exchange rate to have low volatility.  
Hence, an appropriate monetary policy for India must work towards low and stable 
interest rates and slightly undervalued exchange rate with low volatility.    
 The Reserve Bank of India (henceforth RBI) — India’s central bank — has 
explicitly laid down these as among the objective of its monetary policy. In 1998 the 
RBI formally adopted multiple objectives of monetary policy. These are (i) to 
maintain a stable inflation environment; (ii) to maintain appropriate liquidity 
conditions to support higher economic growth; (iii) to ensure orderly conditions in the 
exchange market; to avoid excessive volatility in the exchange rate; and (iv) to 
maintain a stable interest rate environment (RBI, 2002). 
 Before I examine whether, given these objective, inflation targeting is suitable 
for India it is useful to review the case for inflation targeting as espoused by its 
proponents.  
 
III.  Rationale for IT 
 
The time inconsistency literature argues that a purely discretionary policy setting 
leads to higher long-run inflation (Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon, 
1983).7  In view of the high costs of inflation the prescription is for the central bank to 
adopt a rules-based policy to reduce the inflationary bias of discretionary monetary 
policy.  
 The preference for a rules based policy has led to the adoption of nominal 
targets by central banks ostensibly to bring greater credibility and transparency into 
central bank operations. Under a rules based regime central banks set explicit values 
                                                 
7 Further, a discretionary policy does not lead to higher output (than a rules policy) in steady state.  
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for intermediate targets, which they can control, and which are strongly related to the 
ultimate goals of monetary (e.g., stabilization of output and inflation), which 
monetary policy cannot directly control.  
 In recent times emerging market economies such as India have experimented 
with three nominal targets at various times: exchange rate, money supply growth and 
inflation.8  The relative advantages/disadvantages of exchange rate and money growth 
targeting are portrayed in Table 4.  
Table 4:  Advantages and Disadvantages of the Nominal Anchors of Exchange Rate 
Targeting and Monetary Targeting.  
 
 Anchor: Exchange Rate Targeting 
Advantages  
1. This fixes the inflation rate for internationally traded goods and thus directly contributes to keeping 
inflation under control. It is especially useful for sharply reducing inflation in emerging market 
economies.   
2. If the exchange rate peg is credible, it anchors inflation expectations to the inflation rate in the 
anchor country to whose currency it is pegged. 
3. An exchange rate provides an automatic rule for the conduct of monetary policy that avoids the 
time-inconsistency problem. 
4. An exchange rate is simple and direct and, therefore, is well understood by the public. 
Disadvantages  
1. An exchange rate target leads to loss of independent monetary policy (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1996).  
Hence the ability of the monetary authorities to respond to shocks is compromised. 
2. The exchange rate peg may persuade large scale foreign borrowing. In the case of emerging 
market economies such loans are invariably denominated in foreign currency. Large 
accumulation of such loans may lead to a crisis. In most developed countries a devaluation may 
have little direct effect on the balance sheets (since debts are denominated in home currency) 
but not so in emerging market economies since debts are denominated in foreign currency. 
3. Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) argue that exchange rate pegs can lead to financial fragility. 
4. Although exchange rate targeting may be initially successful in bringing inflation down a successful 
speculative attack can lead to a resurgence of inflation.  
 Anchor: Monetary Targeting 
Advantages  
1. An advantage over exchange rate targeting is that monetary targeting enables a central bank to 
adjust its monetary policy to cope with domestic considerations.   
2. A monetary target is easily understood by the public — but not as well as an exchange rate target.  
3. Monetary targets have the advantage of being able to promote almost immediate accountability for 
monetary policy.    
Disadvantages 
1. Typically the link between money growth and inflation is subject to long and uncertain lags.  
2. The demand for money may not be stable, there may be instability of velocity and the money 
supply may not be controllable (Jha and Rath, 2003).  This is especially true of broad monetary 
targets such as M2 or M3 and less so of narrow money.   
 
                                                 
8 Another intermediate target often mentioned in the literature is nominal income targeting. However 
this is both hard to target and poorly related to the ultimate aims of monetary policy.  
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The literature mentions several advantages of IT (Bernanke and Mishkin, 
1997), especially when compared to other nominal anchors. In contrast to exchange 
rate targeting but like monetary targeting, IT enables monetary policy to focus on 
domestic considerations and to respond to shocks to the domestic economy.9  It needs 
to be stated, however, that the goals of IT are defined almost exclusively in terms of 
ameliorating inflation shocks, not other goals that may be of concern. IT, like 
exchange targeting, has the advantage that the people easily understand it. Monetary 
targeting is less likely to be understood in a transparent manner.  Further, since the 
central bank has an explicit numerical inflation target, the possibility of slipping into a 
time inconsistency trap is reduced.   
A recent and growing body of literature has argued that IT provides a 
convenient mechanism for central banks to combine rules and discretion in pursuing 
monetary policy. Thus Svensson (1999) argues that IT is ‘decision making under 
discretion’ with central banks following a targeting rule which sets interest rates to 
reduce the deviation between conditional inflation forecast (the intermediate target of 
monetary policy) and the inflation target to zero over the target horizon. Bernanke and 
Mishkin (1997) and White (2004) have made similar arguments. 
In the context of an emerging market economy such as India the problem of 
monetary management in general and inflation control, in particular, get compounded 
by low policy credibility.  In this context Calvo and Mishkin (2003) argue that the 
emerging market economies remain vulnerable to weak institutional credibility and 
                                                 
9 Another alleged advantage of an IT regime is that deviations from inflation targets are routinely 
allowed in response to supply shocks. The price index on which the official inflation targets are based 
is often defined to exclude or moderate the effects of ‘supply shocks’; for example, the officially 
targeted price index may exclude some combination of food and energy prices, indirect tax changes, 
terms of trade shocks and the direct effects of interest rate changes on the index. Further, following (or 
in anticipation) of a supply shock, such as a rise in the value-added tax, the normal procedure is for the 
central bank to deviate from its planned policies as needed and then to explain the reasons for its action 
to the public.  
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thus to sudden stops of capital inflows. This makes emerging markets prone to 
financial crises and it would be in their interest to adapt a rules-based monetary 
regime (like IT).  In a similar vein Taylor (2002) argues that when rules-based 
policies are followed the anticipation effects of monetary policy are higher. Given 
their less developed financial markets such anticipatory effects are likely to be lower.  
Yet monetary policy could still have considerable effects through the movements of 
wages and property prices. With an IT regime in place this may be subject to lower 
shocks from the monetary regime and, hence, there is transmission channel argument 
for using the IT approach.  
Persuaded by some of these arguments a number of developing countries have 
taken up IT. But India has not. 
 
The mechanics of Inflation Targeting  
The mode of working of a typical IT regime is as follows. The central bank is not 
committed to any particular instrument arrangement and therefore enjoys flexibility in 
setting the interest rate. Typically the central bank revises its inflation and output 
forecast at a frequency determined by that of monetary policy committee meetings 
using updated information. If the conditional inflation forecast is higher than the 
target, the central bank will raise the interest rate to minimize such deviation by the 
end of the targeting horizon, and vice versa. Households and firms then decide upon 
their consumption and investment plans. Blinder (1998) and Taylor (1993, 2002) 
argue that this is close to what many policymakers do in practice.  
It has become common to compare ex post the actual setting of policy rates by 
central banks with what would have been predicted by the Taylor rule. The rule 
suggests that (short-term) interest rates should be changed in response to deviation of 
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inflation from a target and an output gap.  This is the so-called reaction function of 
central banks, literature on which is now blossoming (Svensson, 1999, Clarida et al., 
1998, Mohanty and Klau, 2004).  
 Typically the central bank would set the federal fund rate (in the US) or the 
bank rate (in India) as a function of the output gap, current inflation and the difference 
between current inflation and its inflation target.  The basic format of Taylor’s rule is 
as follows:  
)1(5.0*)(5.0** tttttt yrf +−++= πππ  
where ft* is the bank rate, yt is the output gap expressed as a percentage of GDP and 
rt* is an equilibrium real interest rate.  Taylor assumed that rt* and π were both equal 
to 2 per cent and the weights on yt and (πt- πt*) were both set equal to 0.5. In applying 
his rule to the US for the 1987–92 period Taylor found that the proposed rule 
described the actual performance of policy very well. In particular the addition of 
exchange rates or the level of money supply seemed to add little to the performance of 
(1).  
Of course, IT is not applied mechanically.  The IT rule does not simply focus 
on current inflation but on containing inflation as a medium-term goal. Hence central 
banks pay close attention to indicators that can predict future inflation accurately 
(Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997).  This conclusion is backed by empirical evidence 
from a number of countries.10  
An important consideration in using an IT regime anywhere is deciding the 
price index number to which the IT policy should respond.  Typically the advice is to 
                                                 
10  Thus Seyfried and Bremmer (2003) discover in the case of Australia that the Reserve Bank of 
Australia pays particular attention to inflationary pressures, as measured by the GDP gap. They find a 
relatively high degree of persistence and low speed of adjustment in the interest rate. This indicates that 
the cental bank is interested in interest smoothing in addition to inflation targeting. Similar comments 
apply to several other central banks in developed as well as in transition economies. For a lucid 
discussion of the many factors that are involved in actually running an inflation targeting monetary 
policy regime see Lomax (2005).  
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include a CPI and, even better, a measure of core inflation that ignores excessively 
volatile prices such as those of energy products.11  A pertinent consideration here is 
whether IT should respond to asset price changes.  There have been some significant 
episodes of asset price bubbles in the recent past. Typically these episodes involve 
fundamental factors bringing about an initial rise in the price of assets (e.g. 
commodities, stocks, real estate), which is then magnified through subsequent 
speculative activity followed by a sharp fall that occurs in response to the fact that 
fundamentals have remained unchanged. Should an IT program respond to such asset 
price bubbles?   
Rather than confronting this question directly Bean (2003) analyses how asset 
prices should enter into a monetary policy framework, given an objective function 
that minimizes output gaps and deviation form inflation targets.  He comes to the 
conclusion that the design of an optimal monetary policy regime would require a 
middle solution between completely ignoring asset prices and including asset prices 
regularly in the price index number to be used for inflation targeting.  The former 
would imply that policymakers are completely ignoring the information content of 
asset prices whereas the latter would be inadvisable in a situation when say in 
response to rising asset prices in an otherwise sluggish economy the central bank hat 
to raise interest rates thus aggravating recessionary tendencies. Bean is of the opinion 
that one should include asset prices in an IT framework only to the extent that they 
influence inflationary expectations.  
Central banks now operate in an environment of considerable uncertainty 
about the functioning of the economy as well as global capital flows. Hence it would 
                                                 
11 The pursuit of an IT policy for India is further hamstrung by the fact that a single price index with 
widespread acceptability does not exist. There is a wholesale price index and at least two consumer 
price indices. Measures of core inflation for India are not computed officially. For an effort in this 
direction see Mohanty et al. (2000).  
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be natural to assume that the conduct of monetary policy must be informed by 
examining a number of indicators and cannot rely on just one intermediate target — 
the rate of inflation. Even developed countries (such as New Zealand) with mature 
financial markets and practicing IT examine a number of indicators. In this process 
most central banks practice liquidity management, which broadly follows a two-step 
procedure of estimating market liquidity, autonomous of policy action, to initiate 
liquidity operations to steer monetary conditions. A key advantage of this framework 
is that it is possible to switch between quantitative targets and interest rate targets in 
response to the macroeconomic circumstances of the economy.  Just as there are 
automatic stabilizers in the process of fiscal policy most central banks try to build in 
automatic stabilizers in the liquidity management framework.  First, reserve 
requirements set on an average basis allow the financial system the leverage to adjust 
to temporary/seasonal liquidity shocks on its own account without central bank action. 
A second automatic stabilizer results from the central banks’ preference for encasing 
short-term interest rates in a corridor around some optimal rate than at a point target.  
It is evident that the transformation of monetary policy in the wake of financial sector 
reforms is far from complete.   
 
IV.  Has Inflation Targeting been a Success 
There is considerable debate about whether IT improves performance in regard to 
inflation and output.  Thus whereas Ball and Sheridan (2003) argued that the adoption 
of IT does not lead to a systematic improvement in the growth-inflation tradeoff, Hu 
(2004) argues otherwise.  
It is with this in mind that Fraga et al. (2003) concentrate exclusively on 
emerging market economies (India being one of them) and show that emerging 
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market economies working within an IT framework have higher volatilities of output, 
inflation, interest rates and exchange rates than developed countries using IT. This is 
displayed in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: Volatility and Average of Selected Variables for 1997:1–2002:2 (quarterly data) 
 Volatility of basic variables Average 
Countries  Inflation Exchange 
Rate* 
GDP growth** Interest rate GDP growth Inflation 
Developed Economies  
Australia  2.05 0.13 1.96 0.58 4.78 5.89 
Canada  0.83 0.04 1.30 1.14 3.57 1.96 
Iceland  2.45 0.15 3.13 3.02 4.17 4.05 
New Zealand  1.21 0.16 3.61 1.47 3.09 1.65 
Norway  0.77 0.10 2.25 1.46 2.66 2.44 
Sweden  1.11 0.12 2.41 0.44 2.58 1.24 
Switzerland 0.54 0.08 1.14 0.92 1.79 0.85 
United Kingdom  0.92 0.06 0.79 1.13 2.61 2.46 
Average  1.24 0.11 2.07 1.27 3.16 2.57 
Median  1.02 0.11 2.11 1.13 2.88 2.20 
Emerging Market Economies  
Brazil 2.09 0.31 2.06 7.06 1.81 5.89 
Chile 1.30 0.17 3.25 - 3.11 3.88 
Colombia  5.43 0.25 3.38 10.02 0.81 12.51 
Czech Republic 3.46 0.09 2.73 5.81 1.18 5.31 
Hungary 4.09 0.16 - 1.13 - 11.21 
Israel 3.18 0.10 3.36 3.34 2.98 4.35 
Mexico  5.98 0.07 3.17 7.26 4.05 11.72 
Peru 3.04 0.11 3.45 5.50 2.11 3.89 
Poland  4.13 0.11 2.40 4.14 3.85 8.40 
South Africa 2.13 0.26 1.11 3.65 2.26 6.51 
South Korea  2.36 0.14 6.38 5.52 4.31 3.73 
Thailand  3.25 0.14 6.13 6.72 0.08 2.88 
Average  3.37 0.15 3.40 5.47 2.41 6.69 
Median  3.22 0.14 3.25 5.52 2.26 5.60 
Notes:   * refers to the coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) 
 ** growth rate measured comparing the current quarter to the same quarter of the previous year.  
Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF (quarterly data)  
 
 In addition preparations for a switch to an IT regime requires considerable 
background work. The country should have sufficiently developed financial markets 
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and global capital markets should have adequate confidence in these markets thus 
enabling the country to have a sufficiently flexible exchange rate regime. Further, all 
countries that have adopted IT have a high degree of central bank independence with 
considerable, if not total, freedom in setting monetary policy instruments and a 
minimal burden of financing government deficits. Further these central banks should 
be in the position to use short-term interest rates as the main operating instruments 
and rely on well-developed financial markets to alter longer-term rates and transmit 
the effects of those changes to aggregate demand and inflation. Further, inflation 
targets are announced on the basis of forecasted inflation insofar as they represent a 
promise to offset the foreseeable deviations of future inflation from the pre-specified 
targets over a period of one to two years. All countries using IT aim to enhance the 
credibility of the general macroeconomic policy. This is facilitated by mutual 
agreement between the monetary and fiscal authorities about inflation targets and the 
associated need for fiscal restraint. Further, in most countries IT has been introduced 
when the inflation rate was already low — below 10 per cent. Hence IT has 
contributed to building the credibility of the monetary mechanism and maintaining a 
low rate of inflation rather than bringing down inflation on its own. 
 
V.  Recent Indian Experience with Nominal Targeting  
Indian monetary policy has never pursued a pure nominal targeting regime, opting for 
a combination of rules-based and discretionary measures with the rules-based target 
changing over time.  Thus in the 1980s and early 1990s India opted for the nominal 
anchor of a nominal exchange rate peg, externally, and internally by monetary 
control.  However, there is substantial evidence now that both these policy 
mechanisms have faltered.  An inflexibly pegged exchange rate has proved to be 
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unsustainable in the presence of strong capital flows12 whereas the instability of the 
money demand function as well as its supply (Jha and Rath, 2003) indicates that 
monetary targeting, by itself, is no longer a feasible option.  
 Empirical evidence suggests that in emerging market economies such as India 
central bank interest rates react more strongly to changes in the exchange rate rather 
than changes in the inflation rate or output gap (Mohanty and Klau, 2004).  Hence, at 
this point in time, it does not seem that the standard tool to target inflation — short 
term interest rate — is going to be particularly useful.  In section VIII I buttress this 
with estimates of a VAR model for India.  It appears that even if the RBI wanted to it 
would be difficult for it to pursue a credible IT strategy.   
Even assuming that IT does guarantee price stability does the attainment of 
such price stability guarantee the attainment of financial stability?  In this context RBI 
(2004) notes that the 1990s — a decade of relative price stability- witnessed a number 
of episodes of financial instability indicating that price stability is not a sufficient 
condition for financial stability. Large movements in capital flows and exchange rates 
affect the conduct of monetary policy continually. Thus impacting on the traditional 
tradeoff between inflation and growth is the factor of financial instability. A number 
of authors (Bernanke and Gertler, 2001; Bernanke, 2003; Bean, 2003; and Filrado, 
2004) have argued that irrespective of the fact that price stability may not imply 
financial stability in the short run, a policy focused exclusively on price stability is 
still desirable since there is no evidence that such a policy would endanger financial 
stability. There is little doubt that price stability and financial stability would reinforce 
                                                 
12 However, there is evidence to suggest that India has been able to pursue real effective exchange rate 
(REER) targeting. As Joshi and Sanyal (2004) indicate the RBI has been targeting REER of the Indian 
rupee with regard to the currencies of five countries, U.S.A., Japan, UK, Germany and France, at the 
1993–94 level.  Patel and Srivastava (1997) note that such targeting has more than a transitory effect in 
the Indian context. Unlike in many Latin American countries REER targeting (even when requiring 
nominal devaluations) has not been particularly inflationary in India.  However this benign relationship 
may break as reforms lead to greater capital mobility.  
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each other in the long run but in the short run central banks in emerging market 
economies would often face tradeoffs between the two. In an economy with relative 
price stability the interest rate should not remain passive (as it would in an IT regime) 
if the economy faces a sudden capital outflow. Such situations are likely to be faced 
by central banks on a regular basis in many emerging market economies.  Thus as 
RBI (2004) notes ‘(while) there is very little disagreement over the fact that price 
stability should remain a key objective of monetary policy, reservations persist13 
about adopting it as the sole objective of monetary policy’ (pp. 56). 
In the Indian case there is the further problem that the monetary authority 
faces a persistent fiscal overhang. Ultimately price stability and inflation expectations 
are dependent upon the fiscal regime in the economy. The central bank does not have 
the option of not supporting a high fiscal deficit. If fiscal policy is imprudent and the 
central bank does not help finance the deficit, the end result would still be inflationary 
as the public debt/GDP ratio would turn unsustainable in the medium term and the 
price level could at least partially be determined by the fiscal theory of the price level.  
Thus a rigid adherence to central bank independence may not be appropriate.14  
Fiscal deficits are not only inflationary they also put pressure on real interest 
rates and crowd out private investment (Engen and Hubbard, 2004). There is a vicious 
cycle between inflation and budget deficits — high deficits cause higher inflation, 
which raise interest rates, which then raise the deficit itself by raising debt service 
payments, thus completing a vicious cycle. In addition, the higher inflation has the 
additional feedback effect of reducing the real value of tax collections.  
                                                 
13 On this point see also Epstein (2004).  
14 Even in the context of Latin Amercian countries Jacome and Vazquez (2005) find no causal 
relationship between central bank independence and inflation, although the association between the two 
is strong.   
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In the extant literature much emphasis has been placed on frameworks based 
on the clear mandates of central bank independence and fiscal responsibility 
legislation. On the one hand fiscal rules restrict unbridled government spending and 
this checks the excessive build-up of deficits and public debt, which imparts stability 
to the economy. On the other hand, fiscal rules may restrict the government’s ability 
to take countercyclical policy measures and hence, contribute to increased business 
cycle volatility.  Overall fiscal policy rules are likely to be effective if they are 
accompanied by strong commitments and increased transparency (Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen, 1995).  Hence there is widespread consensus in favour of central bank 
independence backed by some form of fiscal discipline but with a clear emphasis on 
the former. Such clear-cut arrangements are an essential pre-requisite to contain 
inflation and stabilize inflationary expectations.  
Although price stability, output growth, reduction of exchange rate volatility 
and financial stability are the goals of monetary policy in India none of these are 
under the direct control of the central bank. Monetary authorities set intermediate 
targets, which they can control but which are closely correlated and have a stable 
relationship with the ultimate goals of monetary policy. The choice of the 
intermediate targets is critical. A macro variable, if too narrow, such as base money, 
may be fully within the central bank purview but could be incapable of providing an 
effective means to pursue the ultimate objectives of monetary policy. On the other 
hand we can make the mistake of choosing a broad macro target such as nominal 
income, which, while being closely related to the ultimate objectives of monetary 
policy, may not be amenable to central bank control. However, in the Indian case 
there is substantial evidence now that not just the money demand but also the money 
multiplier has become more unstable with the onset of financial sector reforms in 
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India (Jha and Rath, 2003). This argument could be extended to include other nominal 
targets as well and a purely rules-based monetary policy regime starts to appear 
unhelpful.  
 
VI.  Recent Developments in the Design of Monetary Policy in India  
With the progressive widening of fiscal deficits from the 1960s onwards, the burden 
of financing was borne by the RBI and the banking system. The support of the 
banking system to the Government’s borrowing program took the form of a 
progressive increase in the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR). Although interest rates on 
government securities were steadily raised to enhance their attractiveness in the 
market it got increasingly difficult to get voluntary subscriptions even at high rates of 
interest. Thus the SLR was raised to 38.5 per cent by the early 1990s.  The Cash 
Reserve Ratio  (CRR) was increased from 3 per cent in the early 1970s to reach 
almost 25 per cent (if incremental reserve requirements are taken account of) by the 
early 1990s. Despite this liquidity growth remained excessively high during the 1970s 
and 1980s and later spilled over onto inflation. There are limits to the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in containing inflation in the face of expansionary fiscal policy. Not 
only is the Centre’s fiscal deficit still substantial, but also the share of net bank credit 
to the Government in financing the fiscal deficit remains high (hovering around 10 
per cent of GDP for much of the past decade).  
A major development in the design of monetary policy in India was the 
constitution of the Sukhamoy Chakravarty Committee on Monetary Policy in 1985. 
The committee recommended that price stability emerge as the ‘dominant’ objective 
of monetary policy with concomitant commitment to fiscal discipline (RBI 2002, pp. 
67).  When the reforms process began in 1991 the ultimate mission for monetary 
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policy was to emphasize inflation control. Price stability was seen to be critical to 
sustain the process of reforms (RBI 1993).  In the latter half of the 1990s, as the 
economy slowed down, monetary policy pursued an accommodative stance with an 
explicit policy preference for a softer interest rate regime while continuing a constant 
vigil on the inflation front.  In the RBI’s view there are several constraints in pursuing 
a sole price stability objective.   
(i) The recurrence of supply shocks limits the role of monetary policy in the 
inflation outcome.  Structural factors and supply shocks from within and 
abroad make inflation in India depend on monetary as well as non-
monetary factors. McKibbibn and Singh (2003) formally demonstrate the 
inferiority of an IT regime in the context of India.  
(ii) The persistence of fiscal dominance implies that debt management 
function get inextricably linked with the monetary management function.  
(iii) The absence of fully integrated financial markets suggest that the interest 
rate transmission channel of policy is rather weak and yet to evolve fully.  
In particular the lags in the pass-through from the policy rate to bank 
lending rates constrain the adoption of inflation targeting.  
(iv) The high frequency data requirements including those of a fully 
dependable inflation rate for targeting purposes are yet to be made. (RBI 
2004).  
The RBI formally adopted a multiple indicator approach in April 1998. Besides 
broad money which remains an information variable, a host of macroeconomic 
indicators including interest rates or rates of return in different markets (money, 
capital and government securities markets) along with such data as on currency, credit 
extended by banks and financial institutions, fiscal position, trade, capital flows, 
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inflation rate, exchange rate, refinancing and transactions in foreign exchange 
available on high frequency basis are juxtaposed with output data for drawing policy 
perspectives in the process of monetary policy formulation.  
The large list of indicators has been criticized as a ‘check list’ approach, which 
tends to water down the concept of a nominal anchor for monetary policy.  At the 
same time it is very difficult to find a variable, which would be able to encapsulate the 
larger number of factors, which need to go into monetary policy making at this stage 
of transition from a relatively autarkic administered economy to a relatively open 
market-oriented economic system.  
Short-term interest rates have emerged as instruments to signal the stance of 
monetary policy. The RBI uses a mix of policy instruments including changes in 
reserve requirements and standing facilities and open market (including repo) 
operations which affect the quantum of marginal liquidity and changes in policy rates, 
such as the Bank Rate and reverse repo/repo rates, which impact the price of liquidity. 
The RBI had originally conducted its monetary policy through a standard mix of open 
market operations and changes in the Bank Rate.  
The liberalization of the Indian economy required a comprehensive recast of the 
operating procedures of monetary policy.  The RBI had to shift from direct to indirect 
instruments of monetary policy in consonance with the increasing market orientation 
of the economy.  Further, shifts in monetary policy transmission channel necessitated 
policy impulses which would travel through both quantity and rate channels and the 
episodes of volatility in foreign exchange markets emphasized the need for swift 
policy reactions balancing the domestic and external sources of monetization in order 
to maintain orderly conditions in the financial markets. Even within the set of indirect 
instruments the preference is for relatively more market-based instruments such as 
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such as open market operations.  Monetary authorities are increasingly required to 
take cognizance of not only domestic shocks but also external shocks.  Given its 
objectives the RBI is required to monitor various segments of financial markets to 
ensure orderly conditions.  
A more serious challenge to monetary policy comes from the capital account. A 
distinctive feature of capital flows is their greater volatility vis-à-vis trade flows. 
External borrowings of India are denominated in foreign currency. Large devaluations 
not only lead to inflation but can also cause serious currency mismatches with adverse 
effects on the balance sheets of borrowers (banks as well as corporates). The need for 
reserves as self-insurance emanates from the volatile nature of the capital flows. It 
also reflects weakness in the existing international financial architecture. Capital 
inflows can reverse quickly leaving the country exposed to a liquidity crisis. In this 
context the distinction between ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors becomes important. While 
‘push’ factors attribute capital flows to conditions in creditor countries, the ‘pull’ 
factors refer to conditions in debtor (recipient) countries. As a consequence India’s 
ratio of net foreign assets to reserve money has grown from 11.9 per cent in 1990 to 
44.5 per cent in 1996, 65.8 per cent in 2000 and 117.3 per cent in 2003.  
  
VII.  Reasons why India may not be ready for IT 
That transition economies such as India may not be ready for IT is the considered 
view not just of the RBI but also IMF economists. Thus Masson, Savatano and 
Sharma (1997) argue that economic structures in developing countries (including 
India) are incapable of supporting an IT regime in the short to medium runs. This is 
essentially because such countries do not satisfy a number of prerequisites for the 
successful implementation of inflation targeting. The authors consider these to be:  
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(a) Independence of the central bank  
This refers not just to operational efficiency but also to the policy space within which 
the central bank can operate. There are limits to the effectiveness of monetary policy 
in containing inflation in the face of expansionary fiscal policy. Not only is the 
Centre’s fiscal deficit still substantial (the fiscal deficit of the central and state 
governments together has been in the excess of 10 per cent of GDP for several years 
now) but also the share of net bank credit to the Government in financing the fiscal 
deficit remains high. Domestic and financial markets should have enough depth to 
absorb the placement of public and private debt instruments; and the accumulation of 
public debt should be sustainable. In the Indian case while there is some evidence to 
suggest that the latter condition is satisfied (Jha and Sharma, 2004) the first is 
definitely not (Sharma, 2004).  If these conditions are not all satisfied then the 
independence of monetary from fiscal policy is compromised — particularly at high 
rates of monetization of the deficit. The absence of fully integrated financial markets 
suggest that the interest rate transmission channel of policy is rather weak and yet to 
evolve fully.  In particular the lags in the pass-through from the policy rate to bank 
lending rates constrain the adoption of inflation targeting.  
In addition, the central government can, even in this age of financial 
liberalization, apply subtle pressure on the RBI to alter monetary policy. I give two 
instances of these. In the latter half of 2004 when inflation topped 8 per cent in India 
and real interest rates had become negative, the RBI wanted to raise the bank rate to 
lower inflation but could not, under government pressure. Similarly in early 2005 the 
Governor of the RBI publicly voiced concern over volatile FII inflows and suggested 
a fiscal approach to capping them. However, the Finance Minister almost immediately 
rebuffed him.  
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b. Refraining from using any other nominal anchor 
Another important requirement for the successful adoption of IT is that the authorities 
should desist from targeting any other nominal variable such as the exchange rate.  As 
argued above, India needs to maintain a stable and competitive exchange rate to 
encourage exports. It is well known that even in developed economies, which have 
explicitly opted for it, IT is associated with a high degree of exchange rate flexibility. 
In view of their vulnerability to exchange rate crises developing countries such as 
India should be wary of excessive exchange rate flexibility.  A high degree of 
exchange rate flexibility (and, by implication, volatility) will certainly not suit India’s 
economic growth prospects at this juncture.  
 In addition to the above the following reasons also make the adoption of IT 
difficult in India.  
c. Predominance of demand as opposed to supply shocks  
An implicit assumption behind IT that monetary policy has to respond primarily to 
demand side shocks. Balakrishna (1991, 1992) has emphasized the role of supply side 
factors in the context of structuralist models of inflation applied to India.15 The 
recurrence of supply shocks limits the role of monetary policy in the inflation 
outcome.  Structural factors and supply shocks from within and abroad make inflation 
in India depend on monetary as well as non-monetary factors. If there is a negative 
supply shock output falls and inflation rises. If the central bank follows an IT policy it 
will raise interest rates to lower inflation. The resulting drop in aggregate will further 
aggravate the output drop. McKibbin and Singh (2003) demonstrate that because of 
the prevalence of supply shocks an IT regime is not suitable for India. If inflation rises 
because of a demand shock the pursuit of IT will stabilize both inflation and output. 
                                                 
15 For a review of the literature on inflation in India see Callen and Chang (1999).  
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However, if inflation rises because of an adverse supply shock the pursuit of IT will 
exacerbate the recessionary effect on output by reducing demand.  Supply shocks are 
of considerable importance in transition countries such as India.   
d. Practical difficulties in the implementation of IT 
The high frequency data requirements including those of a fully dependable inflation 
rate for targeting purposes are yet to be made (RBI 2004).  Further, there appears to 
be consensus that demand side factors alone cannot explain inflation in India (Callen 
and Chang, 1999), thus making the case for use of an IT program tenuous. 
 
VIII.  Checking for Viability of IT in India 
A prerequisite for the RBI to pursue IT is that there should exist a stable and 
significant relationship between the measure of inflation to be controlled and short-
term interest rates.  I test for this using monthly data over the period April 1992 to 
March 1998 from the RBI’s Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy.  The 
variables used are as follows:  
1. IIP: Index of Industrial  Production (1980-81=100) 
2. REER: Index of real effective exchange rate (36-country), 1985=100 
3. Namon: Narrow Money  
4. Cmrate: Call money rate  
5. Xrate: Exchange rate of Indian rupee vis-a-vis US dollar (monthly averages)  
6. CPI: Consumer Price Index for industrial workers (1982=100) 
7. WPITR20: Trimmed WPI (Source Mohanty et al. 2000) 
8. WPI: Wholesale Price Index (1993-94=100) 
9. WPIADM: Wholesale Administered Price index (Source Mohanty et al. 2000) 
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Monthly dummies were added to the time series and logs were taken of all variables 
except the call money rate. Augmented Dickey Fuller tests (not reported here to 
conserve space) indicated that all series are I(1).  
To illustrate the bivariate relationships between the three candidate inflation 
measures and the monthly economic indicators, the P-values from bivariate Granger 
causality tests are presented in Table 6. Each entry in the table gives the P-values for 
the null hypothesis that the indicator does not cause the inflation measure — i.e., the 
probability of obtaining a sample, which is even less likely to conform to the null 
hypothesis of no Granger-causality than the sample at hand. Values smaller than 5 per 
cent are presented in bold. Three measures of inflation are used — the CPI, WPITR20 
(defined below) and a measure of administered prices (mainly fuel prices). These 
Granger causality results are reported up to eight lags.  
The WPITR20 measure of inflation is developed as follows. Assuming that the 
WPI is the headline measure of inflation, as is the case in India, the trimmed mean 
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where WPITRα is the trimmed WPI computed by ordering the component price 
change data πI and their associated weights wi and removing the components on each 
tail of the distribution by α per cent.  The number of components trimmed from the 
left and right tails of the distribution are k and l respectively. In the case of α = 0 the 
trimmed mean would equal the weighted mean whereas in the case of α = 50 it would 
equal the weighted median.  The root mean square error (RMSE) for any level of 
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where ptα is the trimmed WPI with a trimming ratio of α per cent from each of the 
tails of the price distribution at time t, πt is the 36-month centred moving average 
change in WPI at time t, and n  is the number of samples.  Mohanty et al. (2000) 
conclude that this RMSE is minimized for α=20.  This is what we use for our measure 
of core inflation in India. Data on this variable is available in Mohanty et al. (2000).  
The results of the Granger causality test indicate a weak relation between the 
short-term interest rate (call money rate) and the measures of inflation. In fact only 
WPITR20 seems to have a causal relation with the call money rate.  On the other hand 
the links between the measures of inflation and IIP, narrow money, exchange rate and 
reer appear to be much stronger. Hence the results of the causality tests do not provide 
support for using interest rates as instruments in a policy of inflation targeting.  
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Table 6: P values from Bivariate Granger Causality Tests 
CPI IIP Exrate Narmon REER Cmrate 
Lags      
1 0.22 0.67 0 0.64 0.35 
2 0.4 0.72 0 0.99 0.43 
3 0.69 0.87 0 0.61 0.93 
4 0.1 0.5 0 0.46 0.8 
5 0.01 0.25 0 0.36 0.55 
6 0 0.13 0 0.26 0.58 
7 0 0.12 0 0.12 0.69 
8 0 0.16 0 0.03 0.82 
WPITR20      
Lags      
1 0.06 0 0.07 0.01 0.14 
2 0.01 0 0.01 0 0.09 
3 0 0 0 0 0 
4 0 0 0 0 0.04 
5 0 0 0 0 0.19 
6 0 0 0 0 0.2 
7 0 0 0 0 0.14 
8 0 0 0 0 0.26 
WPIADM      
Lags      
1 0 0.33 0.08 0.75 0.45 
2 0 0.09 0.01 0.56 0.23 
3 0 0.03 0 0.44 0.18 
4 0 0 0 0.2 0.97 
5 0 0 0 0.01 0.44 
6 0 0 0 0 0.41 
7 0 0 0 0 0.4 
8 0 0 0 0 0.12 
      
Figures in Bold significant at 5% level   
      
CPI Consumer Price Index    
WPITR Trimmed whoesale price index   
WPIADM Price Index for the administered goods  
IIP Index of Industrial Production    
Narmon Narrow Money    
Exrate Exchange Rate Rs/$    
Reer Real Effective Exchange Rate   
Cmrate Call Money Rate    
 
An important drawback of the crude Granger causality testing is that it 
provides no information about whether the sign of the (dynamic) bivariate 
relationship is correct from the point of view of economic theory. In particular, while 
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bivariate analysis give a rough indication of statistical relationships between inflation 
itself and leading indicators of inflation, omitted variables bias could be distorting the 
estimates significantly.  I ran a VAR of the variables in STATA. The program 
retained the variables: lcpi, liip, lnarmon, lreer, cmrate. The appendix reports 
complete results on the VAR whereas Table 7 reports on the Vector error Correction 
model, under the stipulation there are three cointegrating variables in the system.  
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Table 7: Vector Error Correction Model from VAR Estimation 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|   Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
D_lcpi      D_lnarmon     
_ce1      _ce1     
L1 -0.07944 0.070814 -1.12 0.262 L1 -0.7398 0.198593 -3.73 0
_ce2      _ce2     
L1 0.023994 0.021023 1.14 0.254 L1 -0.12046 0.058957 -2.04 0.041
_ce3      _ce3     
L1 0.132008 0.071089 1.86 0.063 L1 0.140916 0.199365 0.71 0.48
lcpi      lcpi     
LD 0.131275 0.181922 0.72 0.471 LD -0.18655 0.510191 -0.37 0.715
L2D -0.23919 0.169483 -1.41 0.158 L2D 0.719971 0.475307 1.51 0.13
L3D -0.00169 0.215543 -0.01 0.994 L3D 1.506578 0.60448 2.49 0.013
L4D -0.05345 0.218963 -0.24 0.807 L4D 1.047828 0.614073 1.71 0.088
L5D -0.34028 0.186329 -1.83 0.068 L5D -0.04321 0.522552 -0.08 0.934
L6D -0.44903 0.220185 -2.04 0.041 L6D -0.36949 0.617499 -0.6 0.55
L7D -0.40205 0.200613 -2 0.045 L7D -0.51832 0.56261 -0.92 0.357
lnarmon      lnarmon     
LD -0.02688 0.064869 -0.41 0.679 LD -0.75277 0.181923 -4.14 0
L2D -0.16421 0.075696 -2.17 0.03 L2D -0.62109 0.212286 -2.93 0.003
L3D -0.03529 0.072121 -0.49 0.625 L3D -0.65593 0.202259 -3.24 0.001
L4D 0.035828 0.060855 0.59 0.556 L4D -0.52284 0.170665 -3.06 0.002
L5D -0.13562 0.058738 -2.31 0.021 L5D 0.020943 0.164727 0.13 0.899
L6D -0.1029 0.064414 -1.6 0.11 L6D 0.123258 0.180645 0.68 0.495
L7D 0.057869 0.064654 0.9 0.371 L7D -0.25163 0.18132 -1.39 0.165
lreer      lreer     
LD -0.27617 0.073794 -3.74 0 LD -0.26306 0.206952 -1.27 0.204
L2D -0.3703 0.092663 -4 0 L2D -0.37759 0.259871 -1.45 0.146
L3D -0.20022 0.08892 -2.25 0.024 L3D -0.48248 0.249372 -1.93 0.053
L4D -0.27274 0.073683 -3.7 0 L4D -0.55818 0.20664 -2.7 0.007
L5D -0.21478 0.080797 -2.66 0.008 L5D -0.40356 0.226592 -1.78 0.075
L6D -0.21545 0.071716 -3 0.003 L6D -0.4324 0.201124 -2.15 0.032
L7D -0.1278 0.070095 -1.82 0.068 L7D -0.4683 0.196579 -2.38 0.017
cmrate      cmrate     
LD -0.00026 0.000579 -0.45 0.655 LD 0.005749 0.001624 3.54 0
L2D -0.00038 0.000604 -0.64 0.525 L2D 0.00444 0.001695 2.62 0.009
L3D -0.00094 0.00053 -1.77 0.076 L3D 0.002242 0.001487 1.51 0.132
L4D -0.00141 0.000513 -2.75 0.006 L4D 0.001989 0.001438 1.38 0.167
L5D -0.00117 0.000452 -2.58 0.01 L5D 0.000425 0.001268 0.34 0.737
L6D -0.00061 0.00032 -1.91 0.056 L6D 1.42E-05 0.000897 0.02 0.987
L7D -0.00026 0.000223 -1.17 0.242 L7D 0.00081 0.000626 1.29 0.196
liip      liip     
LD -0.04796 0.10167 -0.47 0.637 LD -0.8081 0.285128 -2.83 0.005
L2D -0.02251 0.092856 -0.24 0.808 L2D -0.50525 0.260411 -1.94 0.052
L3D 0.001402 0.080376 0.02 0.986 L3D -0.1761 0.22541 -0.78 0.435
L4D 0.00135 0.066451 0.02 0.984 L4D 0.102729 0.186358 0.55 0.581
L5D -0.01413 0.058448 -0.24 0.809 L5D 0.183835 0.163915 1.12 0.262
L6D 0.014915 0.048856 0.31 0.76 L6D 0.086086 0.137014 0.63 0.53
L7D 0.003105 0.027414 0.11 0.91 L7D 0.003843 0.076881 0.05 0.96
_cons 0.012931 0.003442 3.76 0 _cons 0.009592 0.009653 0.99 0.32
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Table 7: Vector Error Correction Model from VAR Estimation (cont’d) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|   Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
D_lreer      D_cmrate     
_ce1      _ce1     
L1 0.23669 0.215595 1.1 0.272 L1 -9.2662 57.82143 -0.16 0.873
_ce2      _ce2     
L1 -0.04971 0.064005 -0.78 0.437 L1 25.56354 17.16572 1.49 0.136
_ce3      _ce3     
L1 -0.74058 0.216432 -3.42 0.001 L1 76.52269 58.04598 1.32 0.187
lcpi      lcpi     
LD 0.126411 0.553869 0.23 0.819 LD 91.91419 148.5447 0.62 0.536
L2D -0.40329 0.515999 -0.78 0.434 L2D -163.033 138.388 -1.18 0.239
L3D 0.164285 0.65623 0.25 0.802 L3D -180.547 175.9973 -1.03 0.305
L4D -0.38158 0.666645 -0.57 0.567 L4D 149.13 178.7906 0.83 0.404
L5D -1.45388 0.567289 -2.56 0.01 L5D -67.6367 152.1437 -0.44 0.657
L6D -0.08419 0.670364 -0.13 0.9 L6D -18.56 179.7879 -0.1 0.918
L7D -1.08 0.610776 -1.77 0.077 L7D 91.90868 163.8068 0.56 0.575
lnarmon      lnarmon     
LD -0.35526 0.197497 -1.8 0.072 LD -95.0976 52.9677 -1.8 0.073
L2D 0.031007 0.230461 0.13 0.893 L2D -68.2513 61.80825 -1.1 0.269
L3D 0.036477 0.219575 0.17 0.868 L3D 4.176049 58.8887 0.07 0.943
L4D 0.067441 0.185276 0.36 0.716 L4D -77.564 49.68986 -1.56 0.119
L5D 0.170845 0.17883 0.96 0.339 L5D -100.689 47.96118 -2.1 0.036
L6D 0.256766 0.19611 1.31 0.19 L6D -12.5069 52.59573 -0.24 0.812
L7D 0.039763 0.196843 0.2 0.84 L7D 21.21489 52.79226 0.4 0.688
lreer      lreer     
LD 0.190545 0.224669 0.85 0.396 LD -208.699 60.25501 -3.46 0.001
L2D 0.262241 0.282119 0.93 0.353 L2D -120.102 75.66264 -1.59 0.112
L3D -0.02626 0.270721 -0.1 0.923 L3D -16.066 72.60589 -0.22 0.825
L4D -0.05946 0.224331 -0.27 0.791 L4D -117.275 60.16426 -1.95 0.051
L5D -0.27537 0.245991 -1.12 0.263 L5D -17.1516 65.97329 -0.26 0.795
L6D 0.023921 0.218342 0.11 0.913 L6D -17.2904 58.55819 -0.3 0.768
L7D 0.121808 0.213409 0.57 0.568 L7D -13.6142 57.23499 -0.24 0.812
cmrate      cmrate     
LD 0.003935 0.001763 2.23 0.026 LD -0.68795 0.472923 -1.45 0.146
L2D 0.002514 0.00184 1.37 0.172 L2D -0.45325 0.493473 -0.92 0.358
L3D 0.00029 0.001615 0.18 0.858 L3D -0.77772 0.433042 -1.8 0.073
L4D -2.98E-06 0.001561 0 0.998 L4D -0.41319 0.418531 -0.99 0.324
L5D 0.000851 0.001376 0.62 0.536 L5D -0.06012 0.369058 -0.16 0.871
L6D 0.000101 0.000974 0.1 0.917 L6D -0.11483 0.261236 -0.44 0.66
L7D 0.000975 0.000679 1.43 0.151 L7D 0.17633 0.182181 0.97 0.333
liip      liip     
LD 0.510806 0.309539 1.65 0.099 LD 9.845296 83.01653 0.12 0.906
L2D 0.457648 0.282705 1.62 0.105 L2D 28.21744 75.82004 0.37 0.71
L3D 0.470819 0.244708 1.92 0.054 L3D 9.145638 65.62938 0.14 0.889
L4D 0.477246 0.202312 2.36 0.018 L4D 1.771472 54.25899 0.03 0.974
L5D 0.438266 0.177948 2.46 0.014 L5D -0.14672 47.7246 0 0.998
L6D 0.273063 0.148744 1.84 0.066 L6D 23.42168 39.89235 0.59 0.557
L7D 0.038602 0.083463 0.46 0.644 L7D 0.188936 22.38441 0.01 0.993
_cons -0.01987 0.010479 -1.9 0.058 _cons -0.0002 2.810493 0 1
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Table 7 (cont’d) 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|  
D_liip      
_ce1      
L1 0.853878 0.430052 1.99 0.047 
_ce2      
L1 0.402199 0.127672 3.15 0.002 
_ce3      
L1 -0.15359 0.431722 -0.36 0.722 
lcpi      
LD -1.21458 1.104815 -1.1 0.272 
L2D -3.10089 1.029274 -3.01 0.003 
L3D -1.12249 1.308996 -0.86 0.391 
L4D 2.452112 1.329771 1.84 0.065 
L5D -0.25746 1.131583 -0.23 0.82 
L6D -0.96154 1.337189 -0.72 0.472 
L7D -3.2064 1.218328 -2.63 0.008 
lnarmon      
LD -1.17364 0.393952 -2.98 0.003 
L2D -0.75912 0.459705 -1.65 0.099 
L3D -1.61192 0.43799 -3.68 0 
L4D -0.23846 0.369573 -0.65 0.519 
L5D -0.42517 0.356716 -1.19 0.233 
L6D 0.068239 0.391186 0.17 0.862 
L7D -1.19182 0.392647 -3.04 0.002 
lreer      
LD -0.42598 0.448152 -0.95 0.342 
L2D -0.61895 0.562748 -1.1 0.271 
L3D -1.31204 0.540013 -2.43 0.015 
L4D -0.22143 0.447477 -0.49 0.621 
L5D -0.90564 0.490682 -1.85 0.065 
L6D -1.02694 0.435532 -2.36 0.018 
L7D -0.80851 0.425691 -1.9 0.058 
cmrate      
LD 0.001816 0.003517 0.52 0.606 
L2D 0.00086 0.00367 0.23 0.815 
L3D -0.00173 0.003221 -0.54 0.591 
L4D -0.00314 0.003113 -1.01 0.313 
L5D -0.00522 0.002745 -1.9 0.057 
L6D -0.00404 0.001943 -2.08 0.038 
L7D 0.001187 0.001355 0.88 0.381 
liip      
LD 0.769114 0.617443 1.25 0.213 
L2D 0.880477 0.563919 1.56 0.118 
L3D 1.152687 0.488125 2.36 0.018 
L4D 0.94987 0.403556 2.35 0.019 
L5D 1.019589 0.354956 2.87 0.004 
L6D 0.878757 0.296703 2.96 0.003 
L7D 0.511007 0.166486 3.07 0.002 
_cons 0.012779 0.020903 0.61 0.541 
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 Figure 1 shows that the confidence band for the impulse response function of cmrate 
on lcpi is very wide, hence adding to our agnosticism about the efficacy of inflation 
targeting in India.  
 
Figure 1 
As is evident the ECM for lcpi is not significantly responsive to any of the error 
correction terms. Hence it appears that inflation targeting may be difficult to pursue in 
the Indian context.  
 
IX.  Conclusions  
 
This paper has argued that the primary objective of Indian monetary policy, at least in 
the medium term, has to be the attainment of higher economic growth. Further, since 
India has high inflation aversion, this objective does not conflict with that of short-
term stabilization.  
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The design of monetary policy in India is circumscribed by the fact that the 




as argued that the multi-objective formulation pursued by the RBI has merit. 
This pa e 
ment of a policy towards it.  It continuance at the current 




ssion channel is incomplete). Further the banking system has strong monopo
elements and the government owns overwhelming stake in the banking sectors 
(Sharma 2004). Further, as the financial sector liberalizes some major government 
owned mutual fund operations have had to be bailed out. The development of su
continent liabilities along with the already high fiscal deficit exacerbates monetary 
policy difficulties in the Indian context and there does not appear to be any respite in
sight.  
Monetary policy in India has to be conducted against this background. This 
paper h
per has argued that such monetary policy should be pursued to maintain stabl
interest and inflation rates and a slightly undervalued currency in order to engineer 
higher export led growth. This policy has led to the emergence of substantial capital 
inflows with attendant large build-up of reserves and necessitated considerable 
sterilization operations.  
This accumulation of reserve has now emerged as a significant problem 
necessitating the develop
ems unsustainable if for no other reason then the fact that accumulation o
increasingly large reserves commits wealth to low yielding assets. At the current po
in time two policy packages to address this issue have been discussed in policy 
circles. The first such package is geared towards fiscal correction and monetary 
expansion. Both these policy measures would lead to low inflation rates and red
inflows of foreign capital and, therefore, lower accumulation of reserves at given
of sterilization. A second policy measure is heavily weighted towards real exchange 
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rate appreciation and would thus involve relatively larger current account deficits.  
Real appreciation, in turn, could be secured by nominal appreciation or by permitting
higher inflation.  Policy packages that use import liberalisation would, like real 
appreciation, permit higher absorption via higher current account deficits but without 
penalising exports.  The optimal package for India is a judicious combination of
two broad sets of policies with greater emphasis on the first measure, i.e., the policy 
package should be biased towards fiscal consolidation and import liberalisation, rather 
than real exchange rate appreciation via nominal appreciation or inflation.   
Since rapid export growth is important, it makes sense to err on the side of 
undervaluation of the exchange rate because growth of export demand is rela
 
 these 
ted to the 






ise in foreign exchange reserves. Has this led to a 
 the real exchange rate.  An undervalued exchange rate enables a country to
capture a larger share of world markets.  (If world markets are growing at x per cent, 
then the country’s exports can grow faster than x per cent during an adjustment perio
which can be quite long.)  Growing exports, in turn, raise the incentive to invest.  The
propensity to save also rises in response to the increased profitability of export-
oriented investment.  Moreover, an undervalued exchange rate is likely to boost 
saving by raising the share of profits in national income.  This argument should 
read as implying that unlimited real depreciation is feasible or desirable.  All that
being argued is that there should be a bias towards mild undervaluation because it can 
play a supportive role to complementary outward-oriented trade policies in generatin
a virtuous circle of higher saving, investment, and growth.  As the economy continues 
to grow at high rates import demand would grow concomitantly and getting a current 
account surplus is not inevitable.  
Clearly India has been conducting some form of real exchange rate targeting. 















 the potential rate of growth of the economy? Lal, Bery and Pant (2003) 
indicate that that India’s growth rate in the 1990s could have been up to 2.7 per cent 
per annum higher if the foreign exchange inflows during the decade had been fu
absorbed.  However, as Joshi and Sanyal (2004) show this is a flawed argument.  The
Joshi and Sanyal argument proceeds as follows. If net foreign inflows had been 
absorbed domestic spending (and not foreign exchange reserves) would have risen. 
Reserves as a proportion of GDP rose over the 1990s by an average of about 1.2
cent per annum.  If the entire increase in reserves had been absorbed into investment
each year, the ratio of investment to GDP averaged over the decade would thus have 
been 1.2 per cent higher than it actually was.  The incremental net capital output ratio
(ICOR) in the nineteen-nineties was 2.8.  This implies, assuming a constant ICOR, 
that the increase in India’s growth rate of GDP would have been  1.2/2.8 = 0.4 per 
cent per annum (approx.) over the decade, a far cry from the Lal et al. (2003) estima
of  2.7 per cent.  India’s actual growth rate in the nineteen-nineties was 5.8 per cent
In line with the Joshi-Sanyal argument this could have been, at the most, 6.2 per cent. 
However, these are all optimistic assumptions and disregard the very low level of 
reserves in the base year, 1991. If these are taken into account the growth sacrifice 
was not very high, indeed there could have been a gain in growth as a result of this
policy.  The reasons are as follows. First, the ICOR need not have stayed constant (i
line with the assumption of diminishing returns to capital) — hence the growth 
sacrifice would have been lower. Second, there is little reason to believe that the 
entire reserve accumulation would have been absorbed in investment, irrespectiv
the exchange rate regime in place. Some of it would have spilled over into higher
consumption, thus reducing the growth rate. Further, as is well known, the level of 
foreign exchange reserves in India was inadequate in 1991. Building up of foreign
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reserves from that low base was necessary. Without the cushion of adequate reserve
the shelter of capital controls and the reassurance they provided to the authorities an
the market, the exchange rate could have spun out of control and caused severe 
damage to companies and the financial sector.   
The pursuit of IT would require India to pursue a clean float. This can en




price to be paid is the possibility of a 
highly 
s far 






unstable or inappropriate exchange rate.  India’s policymakers were wise to 
reject this regime and opt for managed floating plus selective controls on capital 
flows.  However, reserves are now at a very comfortable level but are continuing to 
rise at a rapid pace.  The question of whether and how to absorb foreign inflows i
more pertinent now than it was in the 1990s.  
Clearly sterilisation has outlived its usefulness.  Some sterilised reserve 
accumulation can continue to maintain the pre
es in the ratio should be avoided except as a purely short-term response to
manifestly short-term inflows.  The policies espoused here have the advantage that in 
addition to promoting balance of payments adjustment, they are desirable 
independently of the balance of payments, and of the ‘temporary’ or ‘permanent’ 
character of the inflows.  Naturally, due to political and other constraints, t
policies can only be pursued at a moderate pace.  If there is continued acceleration
inflows, despite the adoption of the suggested strategy, the government should 
consider tightening capital inflow controls (e.g. by a Chilean-style tax) so that the 
strategy is not derailed. The appendix to this paper underscores the importance o
capital controls in ensuring that the Indian economy did not go through a crisis in t
late 1990s although its fundamentals were no better than those of many of the 
countries that did suffer such a crisis.  
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 It is not being suggested that India should resist an exchange rate apprec
indefinitely. Once India has grown at h
iation 
igh rates (in excess of 8 per cent) for more than 
two decades so that real incomes have gone up substantially and unemployment and 
poverty have dropped sharply India could contemplate adopting an IT regime 
accompanied by floating exchange rates and capital account convertibility. At the 
present point in time this policy should certainly be eschewed.  
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Appendix I:  
Capital Controls: or why did India escape the East Asian crisis? 
 
It is instructive to compare India and the East Asian countries in 1996 (i.e. just before the 
East-Asian crisis of 1997). The first six columns of Table A1 indicate that, in most respects, 
India’s ‘fundamentals’ (fiscal balance, inflation, current account balance, non-performing 
assets, debt-exports ratio and debt-service ratio) were worse or no better than the crisis-
countries.  All these countries were on loose dollar peg and Indian was only marginally 
different from the rest in this regard except for the fact that India did not allow its real 
exchange rate to appreciate and was able to maintain its real exchange targeting posture.  
 The critical difference between India and the crisis-countries can be seen in the last 
two columns of Table A1.  India managed to keep short-term debt under control, both in 
relation to total debt and in relation to foreign exchange reserves.  Thus, India avoided the 
crisis by avoiding an unstable debt structure, an outcome that was the direct result of controls 
on debt-creating short-term inflows. 
India was able to resist the pressure to adopt capital account convertibility essentially 
because of three reasons: first, the ideology of laissez faire is still not dominant in India, and 
second, foreign banks, which are normally a strong pressure group in favour of capital 
account convertibility, had a very small presence in the country.  Finally, India was ‘too big to 
be bullied’ into adopting capital account convertibility by Wall Street, the IMF and the U.S. 





 Table A1 


















India -9.0 9.0 -11.7 17.3 103.6 21.2 5.3 27.1 
Indonesia -1.0 8.0 -13.0 8.8 180.5 36.6 25.0 166.7 
Korea 0.0 4.9 -14.6 4.1 82.0 9.4 49.4 192.7 
Malaysia 0.7 3.5 -6.4 3.9 40.4 9.0 27.9 39.7 
Philippines 0.3 8.4 -9.9 n.a. 80.1 13.4 19.9 67.9 




FB/GDP: Fiscal Balance as a proportion of GDP 
∆P/P: Rate of Consumer Price Inflation 
CAB/XGS: Current Account Balance as a proportion of exports of goods and services 
NPA: Non-performing Assets of commercial banks as a proportion of total advances 
NCEDT/XGS: Non-Concessional External Debt as a proportion of exports of goods and services 
TDS/XGS: Debt Service as a proportion of exports of goods and services 
SDT/EDT: Short-term external debt as a proportion of total external debt 




FB/GDP, NPA: Bank of International Settlements Annual Reports 1997/98 and 1999/00 and Government of India, Economic 
Survey, 1999/00 
CAB/XGS, NCEDT/XGS, TDS/XGS, SDT/EDT, SDT/RES: World Bank, Global Development Finance 1999 





















Table A2: Diagnostics of VAR 
 
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2 
      
lcpi 41 0.005067 0.9995 47287.61 0 
lnarmon 41 0.014161 0.9987 17759.08 0 
lreer 41 0.015622 0.9755 917.5662 0 
cmrate 41 4.19118 0.8296 111.9541 0 




Table A3: VAR Results  
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|    Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
lcpi       
lcpi       cmrate      
 L1 1.022802 0.180273 5.67 0  L1 -0.00081 0.000261 -3.11 0.002
 L2 -0.34228 0.271756 -1.26 0.208  L2 -0.00018 0.000286 -0.62 0.534
 L3 0.218376 0.324473 0.67 0.501  L3 -0.00059 0.000336 -1.75 0.08
 L4 -0.07116 0.312299 -0.23 0.82  L4 -0.00053 0.000388 -1.36 0.175
 L5 -0.27205 0.291008 -0.93 0.35  L5 0.000224 0.000307 0.73 0.465
 L6 -0.13833 0.261675 -0.53 0.597  L6 0.000593 0.000319 1.86 0.063
 L7 0.059377 0.257 0.23 0.817  L7 0.000382 0.00028 1.36 0.173
 L8 0.430799 0.202095 2.13 0.033  L8 0.000318 0.000242 1.32 0.188
lnarmon       liip      
 L1 0.008492 0.071158 0.12 0.905  L1 0.037282 0.022115 1.69 0.092
 L2 -0.13659 0.067362 -2.03 0.043  L2 0.027046 0.024897 1.09 0.277
 L3 0.128023 0.070778 1.81 0.07  L3 0.022736 0.026506 0.86 0.391
 L4 0.080145 0.067227 1.19 0.233  L4 -0.00672 0.030558 -0.22 0.826
 L5 -0.17319 0.063504 -2.73 0.006  L5 -0.02104 0.031537 -0.67 0.505
 L6 0.022386 0.078049 0.29 0.774  L6 0.024505 0.026951 0.91 0.363
 L7 0.157638 0.073036 2.16 0.031  L7 -0.01157 0.030298 -0.38 0.702
 L8 -0.04553 0.0742 -0.61 0.539  L8 -0.00511 0.02749 -0.19 0.853
lreer       _cons  -0.79317 0.486902 -1.63 0.103
 L1 -0.15141 0.063206 -2.4 0.017 
 L2 -0.10547 0.073198 -1.44 0.15 
 L3 0.16746 0.068378 2.45 0.014 
 L4 -0.06309 0.074517 -0.85 0.397 
 L5 0.054987 0.074121 0.74 0.458 
 L6 0.002281 0.075662 0.03 0.976 
 L7 0.09015 0.074952 1.2 0.229 
 L8 0.130942 0.070642 1.85 0.064 
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Table A3: VAR Results (cont’d) 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|    Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
lnarmon       lreer      
lcpi       lcpi      
 L1 -0.84606 0.503857 -1.68 0.093  L1 0.312424 0.555816 0.56 0.574
 L2 0.828101 0.759548 1.09 0.276  L2 -0.47987 0.837873 -0.57 0.567
 L3 0.834757 0.906892 0.92 0.357  L3 0.540677 1.000412 0.54 0.589
 L4 -0.41613 0.872865 -0.48 0.634  L4 -0.56463 0.962876 -0.59 0.558
 L5 -1.13119 0.813356 -1.39 0.164  L5 -1.04749 0.89723 -1.17 0.243
 L6 -0.24953 0.731373 -0.34 0.733  L6 1.324968 0.806793 1.64 0.101
 L7 -0.18897 0.718307 -0.26 0.792  L7 -0.96616 0.79238 -1.22 0.223
 L8 0.431979 0.564848 0.76 0.444  L8 1.139542 0.623096 1.83 0.067
lnarmon       lnarmon      
 L1 0.093172 0.198884 0.47 0.639  L1 -0.3822 0.219393 -1.74 0.081
 L2 0.131256 0.188275 0.7 0.486  L2 0.385347 0.20769 1.86 0.064
 L3 -0.03368 0.197823 -0.17 0.865  L3 0.005713 0.218222 0.03 0.979
 L4 0.109221 0.187896 0.58 0.561  L4 0.045214 0.207272 0.22 0.827
 L5 0.550528 0.17749 3.1 0.002  L5 0.097733 0.195793 0.5 0.618
 L6 0.132951 0.218143 0.61 0.542  L6 0.065064 0.240638 0.27 0.787
 L7 -0.36539 0.204134 -1.79 0.073  L7 -0.22361 0.225185 -0.99 0.321
 L8 0.223191 0.207386 1.08 0.282  L8 -0.026 0.228772 -0.11 0.91
lreer       lreer      
 L1 -0.10065 0.176659 -0.57 0.569  L1 0.435343 0.194876 2.23 0.025
 L2 -0.08238 0.204586 -0.4 0.687  L2 0.050833 0.225683 0.23 0.822
 L3 -0.10073 0.191114 -0.53 0.598  L3 -0.28885 0.210822 -1.37 0.171
 L4 -0.10341 0.208273 -0.5 0.62  L4 -0.0145 0.229751 -0.06 0.95
 L5 0.160484 0.207165 0.77 0.439  L5 -0.21787 0.228528 -0.95 0.34
 L6 -0.03941 0.211472 -0.19 0.852  L6 0.30773 0.233279 1.32 0.187
 L7 -0.04399 0.209487 -0.21 0.834  L7 0.103859 0.231089 0.45 0.653
 L8 0.456653 0.197441 2.31 0.021  L8 -0.11227 0.217802 -0.52 0.606
cmrate       cmrate      
 L1 0.000473 0.000728 0.65 0.516  L1 -0.00021 0.000803 -0.26 0.798
 L2 -0.00116 0.000799 -1.45 0.148  L2 -0.00152 0.000882 -1.73 0.084
 L3 -0.00211 0.00094 -2.25 0.025  L3 -0.00228 0.001037 -2.19 0.028
 L4 -9.3E-05 0.001085 -0.09 0.932  L4 -0.00039 0.001197 -0.33 0.742
 L5 -0.00154 0.000857 -1.79 0.073  L5 0.000854 0.000946 0.9 0.367
 L6 -0.00055 0.000891 -0.62 0.536  L6 -0.00064 0.000983 -0.65 0.518
 L7 0.000686 0.000784 0.88 0.381  L7 0.00096 0.000864 1.11 0.267
 L8 -0.001 0.000675 -1.48 0.139  L8 -0.00083 0.000745 -1.12 0.264
liip       liip      
 L1 0.173314 0.061812 2.8 0.005  L1 0.059964 0.068186 0.88 0.379
 L2 0.29987 0.069585 4.31 0  L2 -0.05232 0.076761 -0.68 0.495
 L3 0.334331 0.074085 4.51 0  L3 0.008469 0.081724 0.1 0.917
 L4 0.298951 0.085408 3.5 0  L4 -0.00751 0.094216 -0.08 0.936
 L5 0.097806 0.088146 1.11 0.267  L5 -0.0505 0.097236 -0.52 0.603
 L6 -0.08409 0.075328 -1.12 0.264  L6 -0.17463 0.083096 -2.1 0.036
 L7 -0.08179 0.084681 -0.97 0.334  L7 -0.23557 0.093413 -2.52 0.012
 L8 0.002604 0.076833 0.03 0.973  L8 -0.04333 0.084756 -0.51 0.609
_cons  -0.15897 1.360875 -0.12 0.907 _cons  4.472256 1.50121 2.98 0.003
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Table A3: VAR Results (cont’d) 
 
  Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|    Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
cmrate       liip      
lcpi       lcpi      
 L1 74.68881 149.1197 0.5 0.616  L1 -0.24782 1.102951 -0.22 0.822
 L2 -246.757 224.7929 -1.1 0.272  L2 -1.99805 1.662661 -1.2 0.229
 L3 -18.0382 268.4003 -0.07 0.946  L3 2.030853 1.985199 1.02 0.306
 L4 335.3627 258.3298 1.3 0.194  L4 3.598985 1.910714 1.88 0.06
 L5 -213.441 240.7178 -0.89 0.375  L5 -2.76368 1.780448 -1.55 0.121
 L6 46.0124 216.4545 0.21 0.832  L6 -0.61246 1.600987 -0.38 0.702
 L7 119.6916 212.5874 0.56 0.573  L7 -2.32011 1.572384 -1.48 0.14
 L8 -77.2012 167.1703 -0.46 0.644  L8 3.062954 1.236461 2.48 0.013
lnarmon       lnarmon      
 L1 -64.2943 58.86102 -1.09 0.275  L1 -0.82552 0.43536 -1.9 0.058
 L2 25.44524 55.72109 0.46 0.648  L2 0.419107 0.412136 1.02 0.309
 L3 73.49611 58.54681 1.26 0.209  L3 -0.85543 0.433036 -1.98 0.048
 L4 -80.3636 55.609 -1.45 0.148  L4 1.343455 0.411307 3.27 0.001
 L5 -25.5174 52.52931 -0.49 0.627  L5 -0.17104 0.388529 -0.44 0.66
 L6 83.2929 64.56079 1.29 0.197  L6 0.543125 0.477518 1.14 0.255
 L7 32.03567 60.4147 0.53 0.596  L7 -1.24404 0.446852 -2.78 0.005
 L8 -23.4915 61.37725 -0.38 0.702  L8 1.170112 0.453972 2.58 0.01
lreer       lreer      
 L1 -135.6 52.28333 -2.59 0.009  L1 -0.54472 0.386709 -1.41 0.159
 L2 84.71294 60.54839 1.4 0.162  L2 -0.14526 0.447841 -0.32 0.746
 L3 106.3868 56.56137 1.88 0.06  L3 -0.69716 0.418351 -1.67 0.096
 L4 -96.977 61.63972 -1.57 0.116  L4 1.046331 0.455913 2.3 0.022
 L5 101.6617 61.31174 1.66 0.097  L5 -0.68357 0.453487 -1.51 0.132
 L6 3.061448 62.58629 0.05 0.961  L6 -0.14388 0.462914 -0.31 0.756
 L7 5.528831 61.99894 0.09 0.929  L7 0.203282 0.45857 0.44 0.658
 L8 17.43364 58.43399 0.3 0.765  L8 0.78258 0.432202 1.81 0.07
cmrate       cmrate      
 L1 0.144452 0.215456 0.67 0.503  L1 -0.00185 0.001594 -1.16 0.247
 L2 0.212124 0.236495 0.9 0.37  L2 -0.00071 0.001749 -0.41 0.683
 L3 -0.32843 0.27818 -1.18 0.238  L3 -0.00248 0.002058 -1.21 0.227
 L4 0.348757 0.32124 1.09 0.278  L4 -0.00119 0.002376 -0.5 0.618
 L5 0.371263 0.25371 1.46 0.143  L5 -0.00211 0.001877 -1.13 0.26
 L6 -0.00966 0.263765 -0.04 0.971  L6 0.00087 0.001951 0.45 0.656
 L7 0.323037 0.231899 1.39 0.164  L7 0.004995 0.001715 2.91 0.004
 L8 -0.12966 0.199769 -0.65 0.516  L8 -0.00155 0.001478 -1.05 0.293
liip       liip      
 L1 -0.3876 18.29357 -0.02 0.983  L1 0.065177 0.135307 0.48 0.63
 L2 17.39158 20.59418 0.84 0.398  L2 0.111749 0.152323 0.73 0.463
 L3 -21.326 21.92579 -0.97 0.331  L3 0.285742 0.162172 1.76 0.078
 L4 -10.8828 25.27715 -0.43 0.667  L4 -0.1691 0.18696 -0.9 0.366
 L5 -4.76913 26.08732 -0.18 0.855  L5 0.097485 0.192953 0.51 0.613
 L6 21.23645 22.29369 0.95 0.341  L6 -0.11812 0.164893 -0.72 0.474
 L7 -24.273 25.06177 -0.97 0.333  L7 -0.36354 0.185367 -1.96 0.05
 L8 -1.63537 22.7392 -0.07 0.943  L8 -0.49905 0.168189 -2.97 0.003




Table A4: Testing for Cointegration  
 
vecrank lcpi lnarmon lreer cmrate liip, lags(8) 
maximum    trace critical  
rank parms LL eigenvalue statistic value  
0 180 652.8686 . 167.2219 68.52  
1 189 689.0294 0.67698 94.9002 47.21  
2 196 717.0921 0.58395 38.775 29.68  
3 201 731.376 0.36005 10.2072* 15.41  
4 204 736.3806 0.14478 0.1978 3.76  




Table A5: Disgnostics ofVECM 
 
Sample:       9 72 No. of obs = 64  
  AIC  = -16.5743  
Log likelihood = 731.376 HQIC  = -13.9032  
Det(Sigma_ml)  = 8.16E-17 SBIC  = -9.79401  
Equation Parms RMSE R-sq chi2 P>chi2  
       
D_lcpi 39 0.004974 0.9135 253.4932 0  
D_lnarmon 39 0.01395 0.8808 177.3249 0  
D_lreer 39 0.015145 0.716 60.50188 0.0152  
D_cmrate 39 4.06172 0.8136 104.7663 0  




Table A6: Significance of Cointegrating Vectors  
 
Cointegrating equations    
     
Equation Parms chi2 P>chi2  
     
_ce1 2 885.5437 0  
_ce2 2 309.8379 0  
_ce3 2 252.7762 0  
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Table A7: Cointegrating Vectors (Normalized)  
 
 beta Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 
      
_ce1      
 lcpi 1 . . . 
 lnarmon 3.47E-17 . . . 
 lreer 1.67E-16 . . . 
 cmrate 0.016328 0.002172 7.52 0 
 liip -0.90026 0.034785 -25.88 0 
 _cons -0.93483 . . . 
      
_ce2      
 lcpi (dropped)    
 lnarmon 1 . . . 
 lreer (dropped)    
 cmrate -0.03941 0.007557 -5.21 0 
 liip -2.12823 0.121004 -17.59 0 
 _cons 0.534378 . . . 
      
_ce3      
 lcpi 5.55E-17 . . . 
 lnarmon 2.08E-17 . . . 
 lreer 1 . . . 
 cmrate 0.013289 0.00188 7.07 0 
 liip 0.469096 0.030104 15.58 0 
 _cons -6.56834 . . . 
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